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ABSTRACT 
The absolute limits of fiduciary loyalty are misunderstood in the context of directors as 
analyses focus on the interests of the principal alone. This article will demonstrate that 
such an approach is inconsistent with traditional fiduciary analysis and that it is the 
specific undertaking to the principal’s interests that determine the limits of loyalty in a 
fiduciary relationship.  
 
I. OUTER LIMITS OF FIDUCIARY LIABILITY 
A fiduciary is required to be loyal to their principal’s interests1 that they take 
responsibility for. However, what a director takes responsibility for in their fiduciary 
relationship with the company is not easy to determine. The company does not have 
eyes to see or ears to hear and requires its directors to act for it to make up for this 
defect in corporate personality. Therefore, unlike fiduciary relations involving natural 
persons, such as a solicitor-client, where the fiduciary may take responsibility for only 
a specific interest of the principal, and thus be loyal to it, a company requires its 
directors to do everything for it. This has lead to uncertainty and indeterminacy of a 
director’s fiduciary liability since it is difficult to find the outer limits of the duty since a 
company is capable of doing anything. This has lead academics and the courts alike 
to postulate as to what exactly the company’s interests are, in an attempt to define the 
outer limits of the duty. This article intends to demonstrate these attempts approach 
the question from the wrong perspective. It will be evidenced that liability, as with other 
fiduciaries, extends to only those interests that directors take responsibility for in line 
with orthodox fiduciary analysis. Thus liability, it is contended, must be ascertained 
                                                          
1 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch. 1, 18 
from looking at it from the director’s perspective as to determining what interests they 
undertake responsibility for and not simply what are the interests of the company. In 
doing so a wide interpretation of their responsibility is argued that it extends to all 
potential interests unless it is specifically restricted. Those who disagree with a wide 
interpretation cite the negative consequences it would have to matters such as multiple 
directorships, directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance and entrepreneurial activity. 
This article will consider the impact such a wide interpretation has on these matters 
and show that those concerns are unfounded. 
 
Before continuing, this article will only be considering the outer limits of fiduciary liability 
in respect of conflicts of interest by identifying what a director takes responsibility for. 
Thus it will not consider how specific terms of the fiduciary undertaking may limit the 
duty’s application, known as contract first,2 or liability in respect of benefits from third 
parties or self-dealing unless otherwise stated.  
 
II. LOYALTY CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE UNDERTAKING: THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE FIDUCIARY 
Understanding the role and function of a director is important for determining fiduciary 
liability because where someone who has the ability to determine how the interests of 
the beneficiary are to be served this requires the supervision of equity.3 Where the 
director does not have that freedom then the supervision of equity is not required. Thus 
                                                          
2 See, for example, The Northampton Regional Livestock Centre Company Ltd v Cowling [2014] EWHC 
30 (QB); Hilton v Barker Booth and Eastwood [2005] UKHL 8; Hospital Products Ltd v United States 
Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41; Henderson and Others v Merrett Syndicates Ltd and Others 
[1995] 2 A.C. 145; Kelly v Copper [1993] A.C. 205; Moody v Cox [1917] 2 Ch. 71 
3 P Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Law Book Company, 1977); cited by Ross River Ltd v Waveley 
Commercial Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910 at [51]; citing G Bean, Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures: 
The Collaborative Fiduciary Relationship, (Clarendon Press, 1995) 165-7 
Lord Wilberforce held, ‘the subject matter over which the fiduciary obligations extend 
is determined by the character of the venture or undertaking’.4 This is true in respect 
of other areas in respect of obligations to others. The House of Lords have held, in the 
context of the duty of care, ‘the inquiry must be whether the director, or anyone on his 
behalf, conveyed directly or indirectly to the client that the director assumed personal 
responsibility to the client’5 and this has been relied upon in the context of fiduciaries.6 
Thus, one must approach liability from the perspective of the fiduciary and ask what 
interests they took responsibility for rather than from the perspective of the principal as 
to what are their interests. As the Court of Appeal explained, if there is no responsibility 
then there is nothing the duty can be “hung from”.7 
 
The duty is regulated in such a way due to the risk of objectionable self-interest in the 
performance of one’s functions. When a director undertakes responsibility for the 
interests of the company there is a concern that the control it gives the director may 
not be used for the benefit of the company where the interest of the company is in 
conflict with the interest of the director. That self-interest is of concern as the director 
may, amongst other things, be negligent in the performance of their role and function 
so as to advance their own interests.8 Thus a director may use their control over the 
company’s interests to act opportunistically and divert interests to themselves. To 
mitigate against this, liability for a breach is strict.  The duty is prophylactic in that it 
                                                          
4 New Zealand Netherlands Society “Oranje” Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1126, 1130; citing Tufton v 
Sperni [1952] 2 T.L.R. 516; Birtchnell v. Equity Trustees, Executors and Agency Co Ltd (1929) 42 
C.L.R. 384, 408 
5 Williams v Natural Life Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 830, 835 
6 Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd [2012] EWHC 81 at [254] 
7 Ranson v Customer Systems plc [2012] EWCA Civ 841; [2012] I.R.L.R. 769 at [68] 
8 Whichcote v Lawrence (1798) 3 Ves 740, 750-752 (30 ER 1248) 
guards against not just actual conflicts but the risk of one.9 Thus the courts are 
unconcerned with points such as the company not being interested, the director acting 
in good faith or honestly, or the opportunity not belonging to the company. In Bhullar v 
Bhullar it was stated that whether the company had a beneficial interest in an 
opportunity was too formalistic, ‘rather, the question is simply whether the fiduciary's 
exploitation of the opportunity is such as to attract the application of the rule’.10 In Ross 
River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd the Court of Appeal overruled the High Court 
decision that a fiduciary was entitled to make payments to itself and connected parties 
provided they were reasonable and did not disadvantage the principal. The judgment 
ruled that this was contrary to normal fiduciary principles.11 The Supreme Court have 
gone on to say that: 
The notion that the Rule should not apply to a bribe or secret commission received by 
an agent because it could not have been received by, or on behalf of, the principal 
seems unattractive. The whole reason that the agent should not have accepted the 
bribe or secret commission is that it puts him in conflict with his duty to his principal.12 
These cases show that the focus of the court should simply be whether there was a 
conflict between the duty owed to the company and the interests of the director. FHR 
European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC makes it clear that attempts to 
justify a conflict based on ownership of an asset or whether a bribe could be said to be 
intended for the principal would have been permissive in allowing a fiduciary to escape 
strict liability and obtain interests of the principal personally in conflict with their duty, 
defeating its purpose. In Ross River it was also added that said such deviation from 
                                                          
9 Companies Act 2006, s.175(1) 
10 Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 424; [2003] B.C.C. 711 at [28]; approved in FHR European 
Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 at [14], [36] 
11 Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910 at [93] 
12 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 at [37] 
normal fiduciary principles enabled the fiduciary to impose the risk of the relationship 
not working out on the principal. The judge said such relaxation:  
[P]ermitted WCL and Mr Barnett to contend that whether a payment was justified 
depended on reasonable foresight as to the eventual outcome at the date of the 
payment, thereby putting Ross River at the risk of the conclusion to which the judge 
came, that because the evidence at trial had not included any investigation of what 
outcome could reasonably have been foreseen at any relevant dates, therefore Ross 
River was not entitled to any compensation, not having proved a breach by WCL or 
Mr Barnett of the fiduciary obligation.13 
The Court of Appeal noted this shifted the onus of proof on to the principal14 but it is 
for the fiduciary to prove they were not disloyal as modern cases are emphasising.15  
 
However, where there is no undertaking to the company there can be no objectionable 
self-interest. In principle, it is possible for a fiduciary to take on multiple appointments 
and even act against the principal on matters not retained for16 because there is no 
undertaking at one firm to allow for any opportunistic diversion. On this basis a director 
would be prevented from competing with their principal on any matter they undertake 
responsibility for. Therefore there is only a breach if the personal interest conflicts with 
the duty owed to, and not necessarily the interests of, the principal.17  Requiring loyalty 
                                                          
13 Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910 at [93] 
14 Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910 at [94] 
15 The Northampton Regional Livestock Centre Company Ltd v Cowling [2014] EWHC 30 (QB) at [188]; 
Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910 at [64], [94]-[95]; Rossetti Marketing 
Limited v Diamond Sofa Company Limited [2012] EWCA Civ 1021 at [21] 
16 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 126 
17 See, for example, Ranson v Customer Systems plc [2012] EWCA Civ 841; [2012] I.R.L.R. 769 at [68]; 
Caterpillar Logistics Services (UK) Ltd v Huesca de Crean [2011] EWHC 3154 (QB) at [23]; Plus Group 
Ltd v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370; [2003] B.C.C. 332 at [80]; University of Nottingham v Fishel [2000] 
outside of their function would be disproportionate as in those situations there is no 
risk of opportunistic diversion.  
 
Loyalty only extends to those interests the individual takes responsibility for and 
whether an individual is liable requires an examination of the facts.18 Thus to reason 
by analogy in fiduciary liability is said to be dangerous19 because directors do not take 
on the same responsibility as other types of fiduciaries such as solicitors, trustees or 
partners. University of Nottingham v Fishel, for example, stated that whilst the duty in 
a partnership or joint venture may be circumscribed by the scope of the business 
undertaken the same could not be said for an employee’s fiduciary duty because for 
the latter: 
Such persons are undertaking to share the work which falls within the scope of the 
partner or joint venture. The same principle cannot simply be treated as being 
automatically applicable in the very different context of the employment relationship. 
The employee does not in general promise to give his employer the benefit of every 
opportunity falling within the scope of its business.20 
Thus the court looks at the issue from the fiduciary’s perspective. In Fishel the court is 
asking, “what did the employee promise to do?” It appreciates that the employer’s 
interests may be wider than this but the employee does not “promise” to act in the 
interest of the employer for all of them. A recent application of this was in Ranson v 
Customer Systems Plc.21 The Court of Appeal noted that the High Court had not 
                                                          
I.C.R. 1462, 1496; Hodgkinson v Simms [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, 464; New Zealand Netherlands Society 
“Oranje” Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1126, 1130 
18 Cook v Elliot (No 2) [1992] 1 NZLR 676, 685 
19 Cook v Elliot (No 2) [1992] 1 NZLR 676, 685 
20 University of Nottingham v Fishel [2000] I.C.R. 1462, 1496; cited with approval in Ranson v Customer 
Systems plc [2012] EWCA Civ 841; [2012] I.R.L.R. 769 at [43] 
21 Ranson v Customer Systems Plc [2012] EWCA 841 
analysed the duty correctly because they had not judge had not made any clear 
findings as to what the job of the employee was.22 He noted that the judge had erred 
as a result where it was stated that the fact the opportunities the employee pursued 
were outside his territory that he worked in did not help him.23  
 
This interpretation is particularly beneficial when the fiduciary unilaterally takes 
responsibility for the principal’s interests. Looking at what interests the fiduciary takes 
responsibility for allows the court to mould itself to any novel attempt at self-interest. 
For example, in duty-duty conflicts, whilst a fiduciary may not have a duty in respect of 
confidential information about one principal held by the other, any use of it may be a 
fiduciary breach as their access has allowed them to advance another’s interests.24 As 
well in Aas v Benham25 the court was able to look at the wider responsibility of the 
partner and not just the scope of the partnership’s business in ascertaining whether 
they had breached their duty.    
 
It has been contended by Rimer LJ that liability for directors is not circumscribed in the 
same way since the constitution is open to any business, meaning they stand in a 
general fiduciary position with the company and therefore fiduciary liability of a director 
is unlimited.26 However, this approaches liability from the perspective of the company, 
looking only at what its interests are. Rimer LJ reaches the conclusion without any 
                                                          
22 Ranson v Customer Systems Plc [2012] EWCA 841 at [63] 
23 Ranson v Customer Systems Plc [2012] EWCA 841 at [68] 
24 See, for example, Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 A.C. 222; Marks & Spencer plc v Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer [2004] EWCA Civ 741; [2005] P.N.L.R. 4; see also, J Edelman, ‘When do fiduciary duties 
arise?’ (2010) Law Quarterly Review 302 
25 Aas v Benham [1891] 2 Ch. 244, 254 
26 Re Allied Business & Financial Consultants Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 751; [2009] B.C.C. 822 at [69]; see 
also Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 65 
justification beyond the company’s constitution being open to any business but this is 
sparse reasoning. Just because the constitution is open to any business does not 
justify a director having unlimited fiduciary capacity because it does not automatically 
follow that they take responsibility for everything the company is potentially interested 
in. A solicitor’s client’s interests are potentially open-ended but this is no justification 
for the solicitor to be loyal to all the potential interests of the client. A solicitor’s duty is 
circumscribed by contract so there appears no good reason why a director’s duty 
should not be also. There was, in fact, no need for Rimer LJ to resort to such reasoning. 
As he himself noted the fact it was the company’s first venture in to property 
development did not avail the directors from liability27 but not because the constitution 
is open to any business but because the directors had taken responsibility for it. As 
mentioned, the duty can mould itself to novel attempts at self-interest, including first 
attempts at new interests, as it looks at what the individual fiduciary takes responsibility 
for and this can differ from person to person.  
 
Bhullar makes a similar error. Whilst the judge correctly observed the question is 
simply a matter of whether the action attracts the application of the rule he then turned 
to answer that question purely from the perception of the company and its interests. 
The judge used the term ‘worthwhile’ in trying to determine if the company was 
interested.28 As Ranson highlights, in failing to ascertain the role of the fiduciary the 
result of the duty’s application can be erroneous. It is questionable that the 
responsibility of the directors in Bhullar extended to the opportunity. The company was 
deadlocked with the directors agreeing not to pursue any more opportunities. Thus, 
the directors could no longer be said to have responsibility for those interests of the 
company. Such deviation from traditional fiduciary principles, focusing on whether the 
                                                          
27 Re Allied Business & Financial Consultants Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 751; [2009] B.C.C. 822 at [53] 
28 Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 424; [2003] B.C.C. 711 at [41] 
interest was worthwhile would permit the director to act opportunistically if they deem 
it to not be worthwhile but also shift the risk and burden on to principal. 
 
Company law authorities support the position that the undertaking circumscribes 
liability. The judgment given by Sedley LJ in Plus Group Ltd v Pyke was approval of 
this. He observed that, ‘the fiduciary duty of a director to his company is uniform and 
universal. What vary infinitely are the elements of fact and degree which determine 
whether the duty has been breached’.29 This is clear approval from the Court of Appeal 
that the duty will be circumscribed based on the undertaking of the director. Here a 
director was allowed to compete with another company he was director of on the basis 
his fiduciary obligation was nominal as his role was nothing more than a name on 
paper.30 The position in Pyke received positive treatment in Halcyon House Ltd v 
Baines that the fiduciary duty of the director not to compete had ceased because of 
the director’s nominal role.31 Thus the factual circumstances ‘eliminates the duality of 
interests or duty which the law seeks to guard against’.32 
 
Another example is Framlington Group plc v Anderson.33 The directors managed part 
of the company’s assets but were excluded from them when a rival company made an 
offer for it with a view to acquire the services of the directors to continually manage it. 
The directors, as part of the offer but not disclosed to the selling company, were offered 
a substantial sum. By being specifically excluded they no longer had responsibility for 
                                                          
29 Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370; [2003] B.C.C. 332 at [80] 
30 Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] EWCA Civ 370; [2003] B.C.C. 332 at [90]; see also, London and 
Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd v New Mashonaland Exploration Co Ltd [1891] W. N. 165 
31 Halcyon House Ltd v Baines [2014] EWHC 2216 (QB) at [226]-[227] 
32 Halcyon House Ltd v Baines [2014] EWHC 2216 (QB) at [226]; citing Plus Group Ltd v Pyke [2002] 
EWCA Civ 370; [2003] B.C.C. 332 at [90] 
33 Framlington Group plc v Anderson [1995] B.C.C. 611 
the part of the company’s interests and so there could be no conflict. Blackburne J 
held:  
I am not willing to assume, without more, that each was under the particular duty 
alleged. But the point is academic because it is clear that, as regards the sale to 
Rathbone, the three were instructed by Mr Loach speaking on behalf of Framlington 
plc… not to take part in the sale negotiations with Mr Ingall.34  
 
Pyke, Halycon House and Framlington all demonstrate that where the director does 
not have responsibility then there is no need for the supervision of equity since the 
director cannot determine the interests of the company. Conversely FHR and Bhullar 
show that where there is a conflict between personal interest and duty then this attracts 
the application of the rule.  
 
Further evidence in a company context may be drawn from the Supreme Court in 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland35 and Bath v Standard Land Co 
Ltd,36 which demonstrate directors are only accountable for what they undertake 
responsibility for. In Bath it was established that a director was not responsible for his 
principal’s own undertaking. ‘Directors are in a fiduciary relation to the company, but 
not to a stranger with whom the company is dealing.’37 The Supreme Court in Holland 
implicitly approves of Bath. In the appellate history the Court of Appeal rejected that 
an individual was a de facto director38 of his principal’s own undertaking as a corporate 
                                                          
34 Framlington Group plc v Anderson [1995] B.C.C. 611, 628-9 
35 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland [2010] UKSC 51; [2010] 1 W.L.R 2793 
36 Bath v Standard Land Co Ltd [1911] 1 Ch. 618, CA 
37 Bath v Standard Land Co Ltd [1911] 1 Ch. 618, CA, 625; cf. Ross River Ltd v Waveley Commercial 
Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 910 at [42] 
38 For de facto directors see, Re Canadian Land Reclaiming and Colonizing Co (1880) LR 14 Ch D 660; 
Morris v Kanssen [1946] A.C. 459; Re New Par Consols Ltd [1898] 1 Q.B. 573; Re Lo-Line Electric 
Motors Ltd [1988] Ch. 477  
director simply because they were the individual who controlled the corporate director. 
The Supreme Court then refused to extend the concept to such individuals on the 
basis, inter alia, that the modern cases required an assumption of responsibility.39 
Holland is clear authority that a director’s fiduciary responsibility, generally, does not 
extend to separate third party relationships and from that it can be inferred that 
fiduciary loyalty is not owed to principal interests that they are not responsible for.  
 
These cases show that adopting Rimer’s LJ approach would be disproportionate as 
directors may undertake a limited role within the company. Applying unlimited fiduciary 
liability to a director like the ones in Pyke or Halycon House would require them to be 
loyal to a company they effectively had no involvement in. Thus, there is a good policy 
reasons for maintaining that the undertaking circumscribes liability for directors. 
Equally, approaching liability from the sole perspective of the principal can lead to 
erroneous application of the duty, as it does not consider the role of the fiduciary, such 
as the case was in Bhullar and the High Court’s decision in Ranson.  
 
III. WHAT DO DIRECTORS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR? 
If liability is based on the undertaking of the director the next consideration for 
determining the outer limits of their liability is to ascertain what, exactly, they take 
responsibility for. Determining what interests a fiduciary takes responsibility for may be 
more difficult in certain cases of fiduciary relationships such as directors. In instances 
of solicitors, partners or employees there may be a contractual document setting out 
what the respective responsibilities of the fiduciary were,40 although that contractual 
                                                          
39 Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland [2010] UKSC 51; [2010] 1 W.L.R 2793 at [96] 
40 See, Ranson v Customer Systems plc [2012] EWCA Civ 841; [2012] I.R.L.R. 769 at [34]; Faccenda 
Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch. 117, 135; cf. University of Nottingham v Fishel [2000] I.C.R. 1462, 
1493; cited by Halcyon House Ltd v Baines [2014] EWHC 2216 (QB) at [219] 
document may not be conclusive evidence and the judge may look at the 
circumstances of the relationship.41 In these relationships there is likely to be a desired 
specific outcome with details on specific responsibility of the fiduciary. For directors 
the desired outcome is known42 but the means of achieving it are not. In modern times 
a company has unrestricted objects.43 It can diversify in the market and does not have 
to restrict itself to where it operates and what goods or services it provides. The 
Companies Act 2006 does not set out what is a director’s role and function. Section 
250 only provides that a director is ‘anyone occupying the position of director, by 
whatever name called’. Neither the Articles or Association or Common Law definitions 
offer more help with the Model Articles conferring powers of general management on 
the directors.44 Company law cases on de facto directors offer some guidance with 
phrases such as those who have “real influence over the corporate governance 
structure”45 used to identify those responsible as directors. 
 
i. Scope of business test or competing companies? 
Two propositions as to what directors take responsibility for are the scope of business 
test and asking whether the interests compete. However both, in truth, are not seeking 
to ascertain what interests the director took responsibility for and are purely trying to 
determine liability based on the interests of the company without reasoning what is a 
company’s scope of business, what can be said to be a competing company or why 
their liability only extends to these.  
                                                          
41 Aas v Benham [1891] 2 Ch. 244, 254; Ranson v Customer Systems plc [2012] EWCA Civ 841; [2012] 
I.R.L.R. 769 at [62] 
42 See, Companies Act 2006, s. 172 
43 Companies Act 2006, s. 31; cf. Companies Act 2006, s. 7(2) 
44 The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/3229), Part 2 art. 3  
45 Re Mumtaz Properties Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 610 at [30]; citing Re Gemma Ltd [2008] EWHC 546 
(Ch); [2008] B.C.C. 812 at [40] 
 a. Scope of business test 
The scope of business test, derived from the decision in Aas v Benham involving 
partners, lacks any support in the context of directors from the judiciary but has been 
supported by academics. Kershaw and Worthington try to perceive liability based on 
ownership of the opportunity. Worthington argues that only a personal benefit received 
by a fiduciary will only be a breach, inter alia, if it can be said that the opportunity 
belonged to the principal on the basis that it came to the director in their position as 
director.46 Kershaw proposes the approach in Aas is ‘epistemologically consistent with 
the no-conflicts approach but articulates more clearly what remains implicit in the no-
conflicts approach’.47 By this he means opportunities can be viewed through a 
property-type lens that allows the company to exclude the director from pursuing the 
opportunity personally that falls within the company’s scope of business.48 He 
contends that the scope of business test is consistent with the strict orthodox approach 
and the test does not consider any fairness facts.49 He argues this is because it can 
be easily ascertained what is within the company’s scope of business.50 Lim has 
contended that directors, like partners, have their duty circumscribed by contract since 
Lindley LJ in Aas looked at the circumstances as well as the partnership agreement, 
                                                          
46 S Worthington, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies’ (2013) Cambridge Law Journal 720, 734 
47 D Kershaw, ‘Does it matter how the law thinks about corporate opportunities’ (2005) 25(4) LS 533, 
536 
48 D Kershaw, ‘Does it matter how the law thinks about corporate opportunities’ (2005) 25(4) LS 533, 
549 
49 D Kershaw, ‘Does it matter how the law thinks about corporate opportunities’ (2005) 25(4) LS 533, 
554-5 
50 D Kershaw, ‘Does it matter how the law thinks about corporate opportunities’ (2005) 25(4) LS 533, 
554-5, 558 
whereas Rimer LJ only referred to the latter when considering Aas.51 Lim submits 
directors’ and partners’ duties are similar insofar that there is an expectation that they 
behave in a similar way and that the company’s scope of business can be determined 
by looking at relevant corporate documents which will identify the circumstances the 
director agreed to act.52  
 
Rimer LJ denied that the scope of business test applies to directors. His judgment 
concluded that: 
It is not for the director to make his own decision that the company will not be 
interested and to proceed, without more, to appropriate the opportunity for himself. His 
duty is one of undivided loyalty and this is one manifestation of how that duty is 
required to be discharged.53 
Such a statement has previous support in Cook v Deeks, where it was held that it is 
not for a director to unilaterally decide what a company is or is not interested in.54 Rimer 
LJ continued that:  
It may have been improbable that the company could or would want or be able to take 
up the opportunity itself. But the opportunity was there for the company to consider 
and, if so advised, to reject and it was no answer to the claimed breach of the ‘no 
profit’ rule that property investment was something that the company did not do… 
There was no bright line marking off what it did and did not do.55 
Even though he later concluded that liability is unlimited rather than looking at the 
undertaking of the director, Rimer LJ highlights how the scope of business test 
contradicts normal fiduciary principles. Strict liability is imposed on the fiduciary to 
                                                          
51 E Lim, ‘Directors’ fiduciary duties – A new analytical framework’ (2013) 129 LQR 242, 253; citing Aas 
v Benham [1891] 2 Ch. 244, 254 
52 E Lim, ‘Directors’ fiduciary duties – A new analytical framework’ (2013) 129 LQR 242, 253 
53 Re Allied Business & Financial Consultants Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 751; [2009] B.C.C. 822 at [70] 
54 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (PC), 563 
55 Re Allied Business & Financial Consultants Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 751; [2009] B.C.C. 822 at [71] 
prevent against the risk of opportunistic diversion. The director is not free to unilaterally 
decide what does and does not fall within the company’s scope of business. If a 
director is left to choose what the company is or is not interested in by circumscribing 
their duty by scope of business, this would go against the rigid orthodox of fiduciary 
duties and the prophylactic concerns and allow the director the possibility to pursue 
new opportunities personally. Equally, it may result in over-inclusive application if 
applied to scenarios like Pyke. Take, for example, a company in financial distress. If 
an opportunity is presented to a director that is outside the company’s existing scope 
of business it cannot be left to the director to decide whether he or she could have the 
benefit if that opportunity could save the distressed company. If so, as Lord 
Loughborough LC argued, there would be great temptation to be negligent.56 Another 
example may be as a market diversifies. Companies such as Tesco or Apple may be 
good practical examples of the issues a scope of business test would face. Would a 
Tesco director be free to personally pursue an opportunity in designer fashionwear 
since the company only produces quality fashionwear, for example.  
 
Therefore, Kershaw’s and Worthington’s arguments based on ownership of the interest 
are purely looking at the issue from the company’s perspective. They do not consider 
what the director takes responsibility for nor do they fully engage with the questions of 
what is the company’s scope of business and why their responsibility would only 
extend to this. Worthington, for example, argues hypothetically that if directors of FTSE 
100 companies were invited to an art sale there would be a breach if they use corporate 
assets to purchase art or ‘their company is in the business of acquiring art’. She 
contends outside this there would only be a breach if they were invited to attend the 
sale on behalf of their company and not on their own account.57  FHR has noted this 
                                                          
56 Whichcote v Lawrence (1798) 3 Ves 740, 752 (30 ER 1248) 
57 S Worthington, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies’ (2013) Cambridge Law Journal 720, 734 
latter point is too formalistic and incorrect, detracting attention from the application of 
the rule. However, she does not explain why a director of a company that was not in 
the business of “acquiring art” would not be liable. In Re Allied Business just because 
the company had not previously engaged in property development, and was in the 
business of arranging commercial loans, did not mean they could not pursue such an 
opportunity. Worthington does not explain why the company would not be interested 
in this opportunity or why the director has no responsibility to pursue it. She seemingly 
takes it as a fact that the responsibility only extends to the company’s scope of 
business where she notes that proprietary remedies for a breach of loyalty will be 
available for those opportunities pursued personally that are in the company’s line of 
business.58 Cooks v Deeks makes clear that the director cannot unilaterally decide that 
the company is not interested. The duty is proscriptive, thus a director must not act 
with a conflict. There is no recognised exception that the director must not act with a 
conflict except when they can determine the opportunity did not belong to the company 
or fall within its scope of business.   
 
The uncertainty in determining what is within the company’s scope of business also 
offers strong policy reasoning to reject such a test. ‘Clarity and simplicity are highly 
desirable qualities in the law.’59 Whilst Lim tries to argue that the scope of business 
can be ascertained by looking at the company’s documents,60 this is a far too simplistic 
view. It presumes a judge is well placed to ascertain what is the company’s business 
and also that a company discloses all its potential interests in its corporate documents. 
On such reasoning it would be possible for a director of Apple to pursue opportunities 
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in wearable technology until the point Apple announced in its corporate documents it 
would be manufacturing smart watches.  
 
Lim does try to offer an explanation as to why a director’s responsibility is limited to the 
company’s scope of business by drawing his analogy with partners. Lim’s argument 
that the roles are similar is misguided. The company constitution is open to any 
business. A partnership agreement and even extending circumstances were not, at 
least in Aas. ‘Since fiduciary obligations are not “one size fits all” it is, in my judgment, 
dangerous to reason by analogy.’61 A partner agrees to take responsibility for 
advancing the interests stipulated in the partnership agreement and any other interests 
evidenced beyond that making a scope of business test appropriate for partners 
because it identifies the limits of the partner’s responsibility. Likewise a scope of 
business test is inappropriate for employees since an employee does not agree to 
pursue every opportunity falling within the company’s scope of business.62 However, 
the constitution is open to any business and so the duty has the potential to reach 
beyond the company’s current business therefore distinguishing it from a partnership 
agreement. It certainly is not for the director to decide what the company is or is not 
interested in and so it is wrong to draw an analogy with a partner’s fiduciary duty.  
 
b. Competing Companies 
Whilst the courts have specifically rejected the scope of business test, common law 
decisions have shown support for a test based on whether the companies compete.63 
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Again, though, such a test does not cognitively address what is meant by a competing 
company and focuses solely on the interests of the principal. For example, in JD 
Wetherspoons plc v Van de Berg & Co Ltd.64 The case concerned an agreement 
between Wetherspoons (JDW) and Van de Berg (VDB) for the latter to identify and 
acquire plots of land for JDW for use as a public house. It was later discovered that 
VDB had offered land to a known competitor of JDW, Barracuda. Originally the land 
was not offered to Barracuda by VDB, but to Old Aberdeen, a company that the 
directors of VDB were personally interested in, as VDB believed the land would be too 
small for JDW. The court held: 
In the case of Sidcup … the property was too small for JDW and he therefore decided 
not the pass the details to JDW but instead Aberdeen made an offer to purchase the 
freehold. As I have said I see nothing improper if such an occasion occurs provided it 
does not result in a transaction which puts VDB in a conflict of interest. Once it is 
proposed by Old Aberdeen or Old Bacchus to let the premise to Barracuda that in my 
view is a breach of fiduciary duty owed by VDB. It is simply not correct to pass these 
opportunities on to a competitor of the nature of Barracuda.65 
In JDW’s case it was not to the point whether Barracuda was a competitor. There was 
a clear conflict even before the leasehold was passed to them since VDB unilaterally 
decided the land was not suitable for JDW and passed it to Old Aberdeen. The 
judgment demonstrated the role of VDB was to locate and introduce JDW suitable sites 
for acquisition.66 As Cook v Deeks and this case itself make clear,67 the word “suitable” 
makes no difference as it is not for the director to unilaterally decide which sites are or 
are not of interest.  
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Therefore competing companies and scope of business tests focus attention on the 
interests of the company and do not consider what exactly does a director take 
responsibility for. As such there is still a need for an explanation as to a director’s 
specific undertaking. 
 
ii. Is responsibility implied? 
Another contention for the scope of business test to apply is that it is implied in to the 
undertaking that the director only takes responsibility for the interests falling within the 
company’s scope of business.68 Save for the reasons given by Rimer LJ to reject it, 
this seems practically and legally difficult. Practically, the point remains that 
ascertaining what a competing company is or what is within the scope of business is 
uncertain. Technically all companies compete and where the constitution is open there 
are no readily defined limits to what the company can do. Therefore, leaving it to the 
director to determine is not acceptable in light of the purpose and function of the duty. 
Legally, this assertion overlooks key decisions on implied terms. Notably, Hilton offers 
a strong rebuttal to a proposition that it would be implied in to the constitution that a 
director could act with self-interest outside the company’s scope of business. The court 
stated clearly that in absence of express terms to mould the duty69 the notion one 
breach of duty in acting for multiple principals could exonerate another ‘seems contrary 
to common sense and justice’.70 A fiduciary who puts themselves in such a position 
‘does not exonerate him from liability’.71 From the judgment it seems unlikely that a 
director would be able to satisfy the tests for implied terms, such as the officious 
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bystander or reference to business efficacy.72 Lord Walker’s view in the Court of 
Appeal, which the House of Lords agreed with, was that: 
The proposed implied term cannot be justified by any of the various tests for the 
implication of terms into a contract. If, when instructing the respondent firm to act for 
him, the proposed implied term had been put to the appellant, it is inconceivable that 
he would have responded “Yes, of course”, or with words to that effect. He would have 
asked what sort of information his solicitors were talking about and to whom the duty 
of confidentiality was owed. He would surely have asked for guidance as to whether 
his assent to the proposed term would be prejudicial to his interests. The implied term 
route as a way of relieving the respondent solicitors of contractual obligations that they 
would otherwise have owed the appellant seems to me to be an impossible one.73 
It seems equally inconceivable that a company would respond “yes, of course” in 
allowing a director to pursue opportunities the director him or herself viewed as outside 
the company’s scope of business. Surely, the company would want to know more and 
if the opportunity was of no interest the company could authorise the director to pursue 
it personally. The High Court and Court of Appeal have both since offered doubt over 
implied terms of such nature in most fiduciary relationships. The High Court opined 
that such an implied term is only available where it is inherent to the business.74 
‘Residential agents must be free to act for several competing principals otherwise they 
will be unable to perform their function.’75 The same cannot be said of directors. They 
are fully capable of fulfilling their functions without acting for multiple principals. Thus 
the Court of Appeal refused to allow the defence of an implied term to an agent who 
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promoted and sold furniture.76 The High Court added that ‘any argument promoting the 
extension of the inapplicability of the normal fiduciary obligations would need to be 
very cogently justified with strong evidence’.77 Such an implied term continues to be 
contrary to the purpose and function of the duty as it seeks to be permissive in allowing 
directors freedom to choose which interests to be loyal to regardless of undertaking.  
 
iii. Fact sensitive responsibility 
Upon incorporation of the company a separate legal entity is recognised.78 Yet it has 
a defect in that personality. It requires a natural person for it to act because it cannot 
act for itself. The shareholders do not fulfil this role as they, generally, lack the 
incentives to do so. As a result, the courts and legislature have both recognised that a 
company will have directors,79 even in the case even where one has not been validly 
appointed, because of this requirement to have someone act for it. The director is 
essentially a market-induced mechanism to run the company for its benefit. Conversely 
a solicitor’s client does not require the solicitor to act. The client may simply require 
the solicitor’s expertise on a particular matter. The solicitor asked to advise a client on 
the sale of a property does not undertake responsibility to advise on the client’s 
purchase of an unconnected property. Therefore directors’ responsibility is to 
undertake to advance the open-ended interests of the company generally because the 
company cannot act without them. Therefore the rejection of Rimer’s LJ reasoning may 
have little practical difference for some directors since the duty would still be very wide, 
most likely encompassing all opportunities, regardless of how they are received or the 
nature of them. 
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 What is shown here is that a company requires its directors to act for its open-ended 
interests. A partner or solicitor, generally, on the other hand only undertakes 
responsibility for specific interests. A director’s duty extends further because what they 
take responsibility for goes beyond the existing business of the company to every 
interest since it cannot act without its directors.  A company can diversify and if a new 
opportunity is presented to a director that is outside the existing scope of business of 
the company, it cannot be left for the director to take the benefit without authorisation 
since, however improbable, the company may have been interested and the director 
generally will have undertaken responsibility to pursue it. This may be demonstrated 
in the following four figures: 
 
 
Figure 1: Employee-Employer                                        Figure 2: Solicitor-Client 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Partners-Partnership                                        Figure 4: Company-Director 
Principal’s interests 
Duty 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
As all four figures illustrate a principal’s interests, in the darker area, can be anything 
regardless of whether the principal can actually have them. Yet, the duty of each 
individual fiduciary operates differently within those potential interests. The employee 
will have a specific job whilst a solicitor may handle several matters for a client. The 
partnership duty encompasses those interests set out in the partnership agreement 
but future agreements may enable the partnership to extend further. The director’s 
duty totally encompasses the interests of the company because of the nature of their 
undertaking.  
 
This wide test can be distinguished from that in Bhullar. Bhullar based its liability on 
the company’s interests alone taking a wide perspective in rather opaque terms as to 
what is “worthwhile”. The approach here focuses on the responsibility of the director 
and they may not always take on such wide responsibility. Pyke and Framlington 
demonstrate that directors may not always agree to advance the open-ended interests 
of the company but the notion that all directors agree to advance the open-ended 
interests of the company with few exceptions may not be the case. Instances 
concerning non-executive directors may mean it is more common because their role 
is limited compared to that of the executive.80 Executive and non-executive are 
business terms. Both can be categorised as general fiduciaries. The Companies Act 
2006 does not differentiate between them and the duties owed.81 However, their 
fiduciary duty is different because they do not undertake the same responsibility within 
the company. Therefore, failing to differentiate between these types of directors and 
applying such tests based on the company’s interests alone may result in 
disproportionate application because they may not accurately identify the undertaking 
of the director in question. 
 
IV. CONSEQUENCES 
With such a wide interpretation of director’s loyalty this may have some significant 
consequences in respect of many issues, particularly in relation to additional 
appointments, D&O insurance and entrepreneurial activity.  
 
a. Entrepreneurial activity 
One concern of a wider interpretation of the extent of the duty for directors is the impact 
it might have of entrepreneurial activity. However, empirical evidence fails to support 
that a wider duty would have any significant negative impact. Deakin and Hughes’ 
study in 1999 revealed that any disclosure requirements should not be costly as 
internal procedures are already in place within most companies.82 The research 
reported only 7% of directors gave up on an opportunity because of a conflict, and only 
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6% reported approval to pursue an opportunity.83 As well, it has been reported that 
enforcement of duties has been particularly difficult with low levels of litigation as there 
were effectively zero claims filed against directors of public listed firms between 2004-
200684 and only 2% of directors reporting their firm to have commenced litigation 
against one of its directors for breach of duty.85 However, it is considered that such 
responses depend on the respondents understanding of what a conflict is. This figure 
may be susceptible to increase if the respondents considered a conflict to be a 
narrower interpretation than that proposed here.  Kershaw has shown more support 
recently of this noting that disclosure costs are in fact minimal under the current system 
and a strict rule does not detriment entrepreneurial activity.86 Therefore, companies 
will generally have first refusal over their directors, provided it falls within the director’s 
undertaking, but anything else would go against the purpose and function of the duty. 
As well, the encompassing nature of the duty for directors would not cause any 
significant practical problems such as cost of disclosure or deterring entrepreneurial 
activity. 
 
b. D&O insurance 
Despite there being little risk to directors of litigation from the company itself,87 with this 
wide interpretation, given the inconsistencies in judicial and academic interpretations 
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of the scope of a director’s fiduciary duty, there is the consequence that directors’ 
insurance,88 if they have any, may not adequately cover their potential liability, 
especially since such claims, when they occur, are large.89 It may be that directors will 
find themselves facing claims when the personal interest pursued is far removed from 
the business of his current principal, but given the constantly changing nature of a 
company’s business, such as in the examples of Apple or Tesco, it should be of 
concern to directors as to whether any policy suitably covers such liability. Would a 
director of Apple be suitably covered for an interest in a fashion retail company if a 
claim were to be made against that director, even before they produced watches?  
 
Normally insurance cover will be available for directors. Whilst Companies Act 2006, 
Ch 7 makes clear that any provision purporting to exempt a director from liability for a 
breach of duty is void,90 Section 233 makes it permissible to maintain insurance for the 
director against any such liability mentioned in section 232.91 However, after the 
Equitable Life litigation,92 Roach noted that the cost of insurance was increasing yet 
the coverage was less comprehensive and awards made against directors may 
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outstrip cover.93 If cover is not available or suitable though the company itself can 
advance legal fees to the director in respect of a claim brought by it against the director, 
that advance is treated as a loan if the director loses the litigation.94 Parsons has noted 
the complexities of D&O insurance citing the multiple sources of law on directors’ 
duties and its own complexity as a reason behind this.95 Given the wide, uncertain and 
strict nature of the duty these provisions may leave directors vulnerable if they are not 
adequately covered by their insurance. Certainly more research on such breaches of 
duty would be beneficial. 
 
c. Multiple directorships 
A final concern is that a duty that encompasses all opportunities would essentially 
make it difficult to serve on more than one corporate board, which is a common feature 
for non-executive directors. It has been argued that such a wide interpretation 
effectively gives the company first refusal on opportunities, whilst Lim argues that, as 
a matter of policy, the scope of business test should apply to enable directors to sit on 
other corporate boards.96  
 
Such positions are difficult to reconcile with though. In respect of first refusal, directors 
should be aware that, generally, their role is to undertake responsibility for the open-
ended interests of the company. It cannot be left to the director to then decide what 
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opportunities the company is interested in because, as Rimer LJ stated, there is no 
“bright line” marking off what the company is capable of doing however improbable it 
is that the company might pursue the opportunity.97 If directors were free to decide 
they may not fulfil their undertaking to pursue the open-ended interests of the company 
because of the prospect of personal gain, thus failing to adhere to the purpose and 
function of the duty.  
 
With multiple appointments the point is taken that multiple appointments can be of 
benefit to a company and should not be deterred if taken for the benefit of the company. 
Lord Upjohn believed it would be a “great pity” if such a conclusion was reached that 
multiple appointments could not be taken,98 legislators, such as Baroness Noakes 
have described them as a “reality of modern life”,99 and economists, notably Fama and 
Jensen, who highlighted those with existing appointments had proven worth in the 
managerial labour market.100 Yet it is predominately non-executives who take on 
additional roles and it has been noted that their role is not as burdensome as an 
executive. Therefore, a wide interpretation of the duty will not affect non-executives in 
the same way it would an executive director, as it is unlikely that they take responsibility 
for all potential interests. Yet, the test focusing on what the director specifically takes 
responsibility for by looking the facts enables the court to impose liability where a non-
executive does take responsibility. Therefore it is an unfounded argument that 
directors would be incapable of sitting on other boards if a wide interpretation is 
adopted.    
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It is also a useful reminder that whilst a wide duty may impact on these three areas, if 
the director honestly believes the company would not be interested then they should 
seek authorisation from the principal and immunise themselves from liability. Therefore 
entrepreneurial activity and additional appointments would not be affected and 
insurance would not be an issue.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The duty of a fiduciary is strict. Once there is a conflict between duty and interest the 
fiduciary may only avail themselves from liability through authorisation. Yet this applies 
only when action attracts the application of the rule. This means if there is no duty i.e. 
no undertaking for a particular interest, then the duty does not apply. This applies 
equally to directors as it does any other type of fiduciary. A director is free to act against 
his or her principal’s interests provided that the action falls outside the scope of their 
responsibility to the company so it does not attract the application of the rule. Thus, 
one must approach liability from the perspective of the fiduciary and ask what 
responsibility have they undertaken. Yet, company law authorities, including Bhullar 
and Re Allied Business, have sought to determine liability by looking at liability from 
the perspective of the principal and trying to ascertain what are its interests. Re Allied 
Business notably was incorrect in its reasoning as it did not offer a clear explanation 
for diverging from traditional fiduciary principals other than saying a company’s 
constitution was open to all business. As the High Court stated, if fiduciary principles 
are to be changed then there needs to be a clear and cogently reasoned argument for 
doing so.101 Whilst Bhullar did not diverge from the traditional principles and confirmed 
that it is a matter of whether the action attracts the application of the rule, the 
application of those principles differed much as they did in Ross River. As Ranson 
highlighted the judge must be guided by the job undertaken by fiduciary to determine 
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their liability and thus looking at what the fiduciary promised to do. Bhullar did not 
engage with this question and looked at liability from the perspective of the fiduciary, 
asking whether the opportunity was “worthwhile” for the company. Arguably this 
reaches an erroneous conclusion but as a matter of law and not as a matter of policy 
that others have argued.102  
 
Existing authorities and principles should guide judges when determining fiduciary 
liability of a director. No cognitively reasoned argument has been presented for treating 
directors differently and determining liability on the basis of the company’s interests 
alone. Existing company law authorities do exist on this matter and it is surprising that 
the decision in Pyke is not more widely cited.  
 
Even though there is acceptance amongst academics and the courts, in places, that 
directors do have their duty circumscribed by their undertaking there is further dispute 
as to what that undertaking is and often the focus turns once again on the perspective 
of the company as to what its interests are. These attempts such as scope of business, 
competing companies and implied terms do not explain why a director’s responsibility 
is only limited to these issues, what these terms mean and how they are justified in 
differing from the orthodox fiduciary analysis. Where such explanations are offered, 
such as Lim who contends directors are like partners and that their duty should be 
circumscribed by the scope of business he does not appreciate the differences in the 
undertaking of a director compared to a partner as his analysis is purely focused on 
the interests of the principal. If a director’s responsibility is to only extend to those 
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opportunities within the company’s scope of business there has yet to be a clearly 
defined argument that supports this approach. Three key arguments make such a test 
unlikely to receive adoption. First, given the uncertainty in such an approach, it is 
unlikely to be adopted. Second, such a test would permit the director to act 
opportunistically within the confides of their undertaking and third, shift the burden and 
risk on to the principal. Both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, in FHR and Ross 
River respectively, have ruled such attempts as outside normal fiduciary principals and 
are unlikely to be adopted. It is evidenced that the responsibility of a director 
encompasses all opportunities and if they wish to pursue opportunities personally, they 
must receive authorisation from their principal. Failing that, the director would need to 
evidence that they have not been disloyal by showing the opportunity fell outside their 
responsibility to the company’s interests or as the Companies Act 2006 puts it ‘the 
situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest’.103 
 
Even with such a wide duty the negative consequences some propose would occur 
are unfounded. Directors can still sit on multiple boards and it is unlikely they would be 
exposed to increased litigation that is uninsured. As the empirical evidence suggests, 
neither would it stifle entrepreneurial activity by giving the company first refusal on all 
opportunities. The courts should be quick to recognise the wide extent of a director’s 
duty so directors themselves can adequately assess their liability and the judiciary can 
avoid and further erroneous application of the duty.  
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